Methods for calculating cartel damages: a survey by Doose, Anna Maria
Ilmenau University of Technology 







Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, Vol. 18, No. 83  
 
Methods for Calculating Cartel Damages: A Survey  
 









Institute of Economics 
Ehrenbergstraße 29 
Ernst-Abbe-Zentrum 
D-98 684 Ilmenau  
Phone 03677/69-4030/-4032 
Fax  03677/69-4203    





Methods for Calculating Cartel Damages: A Survey 
Anna Maria Doose1 
The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have 
become more and more important as private damage suits in the aftermath of antitrust 
litigation increase. The approaches implementation is embedded into current legal environ-
ments with regards to the estimation approaches being used for quantification of cartel 
damages. The direct comparison of methods shows that difference methods convince due 
to their simplicity and plausibility in results as well as replicability. Cost-based approaches 
have to overcome hurdles but still are easy to conduct and comparatively more accurate. In 
contrast, price prediction takes market changes into account and the market simulation pre-
sents the most sophisticated and flexible approach, provided that assumptions are correct 
and correctly implemented, and therefore approaches the “real world” counterfactual as 
approximate as possible. 
Key words: Cartels, damages, antitrust policy, public enforcement, private enforcement  
JEL: C10, C15, L12, L13, L4, K21, K41 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important tools a competition authority has at its disposal in order to pro-
tect competition and deter from future antitrust infringements is to impose cartel fines as a 
consequence of anticompetitive behavior of market players. The European Commission im-
posed approximately 5.4 billion Euros of fines within 16 cartel procedures, in which 120 
companies were involved during the last three years.2 
Attached procedures of antitrust litigations, such as private damage claims, whose enforce-
ability is more and more favored by western antitrust regimes, and the passing-on effect, 
namely the price increases for indirect buyers of cartelized goods, whose defense has been 
rendered possible e.g. in the European Union and Germany in 2008 respectively 2011, are 
increasingly relevant, next to cartel punishments of antitrust authorities themselves.   
In order to determine the actual size of the cartel overcharge, the difference from the price 
that would have emerged under competitive conditions and the cartel price, various quanti-
fication methods can be employed. In comparison to the determination of fines through 
antitrust authorities, which normally solely use a defined percentage or benchmark, such as 
the turnover of the cartel members in the European Union, or the minimum of 100 million 
Dollars in the United States, finding out about the hypothetical but-for price is a far more 
elaborate procedure.  
The application of existing quantification methods depends on the availability of infor-
mation, on the one hand, and the envisaged precision of the results, on the other hand. 
1  Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics and Lademann & Associates GmbH, Ham-
burg. Email: annamaria.doose@gmail.com. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are 
not associated to Lademann & Associates and completely represent my own work. 
2  See European Commission (2013b).  
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Before and after and yardstick approaches as well as difference-in-differences tests are com-
paratively modest in their information requirement, but no market changes are considered 
within the investigation period. Cost based quantification methods entail the distinction be-
tween economic and accounting costs, imply a static view and perfect competition, but gen-
erate adequate results in cases where only very few data are available. Price prediction stands 
out due to its non-static view and the possibility of taking oligopolistic behavior into account. 
Nevertheless, the same cartel overcharge is assumed for every year under consideration and 
misspecifications are possible that could decisively influence estimation results. Damage 
quantification based on simulation methods might be closest to real-world competitive mar-
ket outcomes, as they do not rely on cost data provided by accused parties and are very 
transparent for outsiders. At the same time, they present the largest challenges for econo-
mists with regard to market comprehension requirements. 
Estimating cartel overcharges will thus get more and more complex, if dynamic effects are 
taken into account (e.g. if competition would induce significant changes in quantity or in-
novation, market entries occur, etc.). Defining the exact cartel period, as the fundamental 
prerequisite for damage calculation, might already present an insurmountable obstacle. Price 
patterns might not be that obvious3 as e.g. cartels do need some time to form, or episodes 
of cheating that disturb the price pattern, or temporary reversions to competitive prices oc-
cur. The closer the quantification of the actual damage induced by cartels gets to reality 
(drawing on different market types, such as oligopolistic ones, or types of competition, Ber-
trand vs. Cournot), the more complex this task becomes.   
This paper’s analysis focuses on dealings with anticompetitive behavior in Europe and on 
some German variations, even though a few particulars of the United States (hereafter: U.S.) 
law are mentioned. The paper is structured as follows: chapter two gives an overview of 
different types of cartels, the three cartel effects, shows how the relevant antitrust regimes 
impose fines on cartel infringements, and gives an overview of private damage claims. Chap-
ter three describes the established methods on quantification of cartel overcharges and de-
tails each approach’s advantages and disadvantages. The chapter four concludes the find-
ings. 
2. (On the Economics of) Cartel Damages and Sanctions 
2.1 Cartels – An Overview 
Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between related companies that aim at the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the European Union (hereafter: EU).4 
Collusive agreements of companies that regularly lead to price increases thus present anti-
trust infringements.  
3  This means that prices do not always obviously increase at the beginning of collusive agreements 
and do not necessarily automatically decrease after the cartel’s revelation (downward open U-
shape of price patterns).  
4  See European Union (2008). 
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First of all, one should pay attention to the distinction between tacit and explicit collusion. 
Tacit collusion is not forbidden under contemporary antitrust law, as firms do not commit 
to illegal behavior by explicit coordination, even though this behavior might have anticom-
petitive effects if the market reaches a collusive equilibrium. Implicit collusion depicts the 
state, in which companies coordinate their behavior without explicitly communicating with 
each other. Only explicit agreements within cartels cross the line of anti-competitiveness. 
Explicit collusion, meaning that companies explicitly coordinate determined actions to 
achieve a collusive result, is juridically considered as illegal behavior. 
Companies that decide to build a cartel or to join an already existing one always pursue a 
target, most of the times to enhance profits to supracompetitive levels, regardless of 
whether the collusion takes place between horizontally or vertically related companies. There 
are three main objectives collusive agreements focus on – prices and/or quantities and/or 
regions – and thus the following categories of prohibited cartels, so-called hardcore cartels, 
can be derived: 
1. Price cartels are collusive agreements between related companies, in which they agree 
upon prices for the cartelized product. The prices are set higher than some competitive 
benchmark and/or are close to monopoly prices.5 Negotiations regularly focus on fixed or 
minimum prices. Special types of price cartels are the so-called submission cartels. These 
aim at organizing the cartel members’ behavior in public procurement procedures. Mu-
tual underbidding should be avoided, so that every cartel member can count on the ac-
ceptance of its assigned tender. The particular tenders, the chronology of winning mem-
bers, as well as the minimum quotations are determined beforehand.  
2. Quota cartels are a type of allocation cartels. The companies concerned allocate produc-
tion volumes or sales quantities in proportion to each company’s own capacities in order 
to agree upon quantitative offers. Determining prices is also easily achievable within such 
agreements.  
3. Market sharing agreements are an alternative to achieve the same collusive result as price 
or quota cartels. Market sharing means that some or all firms in a particular market divide 
it between each other. Each cartel member only sells its products in its designated area 
afterwards. By means of this cartel agreement, the cartelists are able to set each possible 
price, as they can be sure about the other cartelists not undercutting it.6 
 
2.2 Three cartel effects and further affected areas 
There are three potential effects, which could possibly be induced by a cartel. The first one 
is the direct cartel effect. As normally supposed, cartels are actually formed in order to es-
tablish higher market prices compared to the price that would have arisen under competitive 
market conditions. If the cartelized product is an intermediate production good, e.g. the 
direct buyer purchases this good as an input factor for its end product, which the direct 
buyer finally sells to the indirect buyer/end customer, the direct cartel effect will be reflected 
by an increase of the direct purchasers’ variable costs.  
5  See e.g. Motta (2004). p. 138. 
6  See e.g. Irish Competition Authority (1999).  
3 
 
                                                          
Within such a value-added chain, a cartel induced price increase also results in an increase 
of the indirect purchasers’ costs. Due to the fact that the intermediate good has undergone 
a price increase, the direct buyer will automatically have a significant incentive to pass on 
part or all of the price increase to its customer. This effect is called passing-on effect and 
depicts the difference between the final price increase that end customers face and a hypo-
thetical competitive counterfactual.   
The third and last direct price effect of collusion is the output effect. A price increase of the 
cartelized product normally has a negative effect on the quantity of sales. Higher prices result 
in lower demand. This effect thus results from smaller sales quantities of cartelists as reaction 
to the price increase.7 This effect may even outweigh the enhancing effect of per unit reve-
nue itself induced by the respective collusive agreement, especially if the direct buyer in the 
downstream market is a monopsonist or has particular buyer power.8 
Cartels might have an impact on players on the same market that are no cartel members, 
the cartel outsiders. By having a softening effect on competition due to agreed upon prices 
or reduced quantity, cartel outsiders can benefit from the very same facts, and thus can also 
more easily enforce higher prices or decreased quantity than without the cartel. This is called 
the umbrella effect.9  
The indirect effects of cartels, such as the umbrella effect, as well as quantity effects of an-
ticompetitive behavior will not be addressed in the following chapters. Direct price effects 
on intermediate or end customers that are vertically related to the anticompetitive infringe-
ment are the field of examination.    
 
2.3 Proceedings of Competition Authorities 
After a cartel's detection, the responsible competition authority has to define the sanctions 
for the cartelists. These regularly depend on the duration of illegal behavior, the respective 
legal environment, and the cartel's organizational characteristics. There is a current discus-
sion on whether more economic approaches and sanction calculation methods should be 
taken into account within this antitrust dimension. Traditional measures for the assessment 
of harm for the direct buyers regularly underestimate their monetary harm, especially when 
the cartelized product constitutes an input product and the downstream market is not per-
fectly competitive.10 
7  See e.g. Verboven and Dijk (2009).  
8  See Hellwig (2007), p. 124 et seqq. 
9  See e.g. Friederiszick and Röller (2010), p. 10, or Inderst et al. (2013b), where the latter paper 
particularly examines umbrella effects that redirect demand to substitute products.  
10  See Basso and Ross (2010). 
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In most of the cases, a cartel member itself reveals anticompetitive behavior.11 It thereby 
makes use of the (in most western countries) established leniency program, which guaran-
tees the whispering cartelist reduced or no fines within fine proceedings.12 After a cartel has 
been detected, the responsible competition authority will undertake an investigation con-
cerning the cartelized companies and will finally impose fines on them. 
The enacted guidelines on the setting of fines within the European Union (hereafter: EU) and 
its member states were published in 2006. These guidelines determine how the concerned 
competition authorities should calculate cartel fines. The procedure can be outlined as fol-
lows: First, a basic amount for each undertaking or association will be determined. Second, 
this basic amount will be adjusted upwards or downwards.  
In the EU, the basic amount is composed of various sales benchmarks and depends “on the 
degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of infringement.”13 
The maximum value of sales serving as the basis for the fine calculation is capped at 30%. 
For determining the specific percentage, market factors such as the nature of antitrust be-
havior, market shares, and the geographic scope of the infringement are also taken into 
account. Adjusting factors of this specific basic amount are: 
• Aggravating circumstances: repeated or not omitted infringement (up to additional 
100% of the basic amount), refusal to cooperate, and a role of leader within or instigator 
of the anticompetitive infringement. 
• Mitigating circumstances: rapid termination of legal offence after detection, evidence for 
negligence in cartel participation, considerably limited involvement in infringement, ef-
fective cooperation with competition institutions, anticompetitive behavior encouraged 
by antitrust institution or by legislation. 
• Specific increases of the basic amount in order to implement a deterrent mechanism. 
The legal maximum cap of the European corporate cartel fine is at 10% of the undertakings’ 
or association’s total turnover in the business year the proceedings take place.14 Under spe-
cific circumstances, the competition institution may take a company’s financial situation into 
account. For example, if a firm made an application with regards to its inability to pay the 
envisaged fine.15 This exception’s importance increased during the current financial crisis.16 
The Sherman Act presents the competition law counterpart in the U.S., even though not 
being as clearly structured and interpreted by reference to guidelines as the ones within the 
EU. The U.S. law also includes the possibility of inflicting imprisonment penalties up to ten 
11  See e.g. Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007), p. 178 et seqq.  
12  See homepage of the German competition authority “Bundeskartellamt“: http://www.bun-
deskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/Kartellverbot_e/kartellverbot_eW3DnavidW2629.php. 
13  European Union (2006), Section 1, Point 19. 
14  The 10%-constraint can lead to ambiguous results in case of a one-product-firm and is broadly 
discussed in scientific literature. See e.g. Soyez (2013), p. 103.   
15  See European Union (2006).  
16  The EC received nine inability-to-pay applications during 2008 and 2009. This number increased 
up to 32 (out of 69, thus approximately 46%) in 2010. See Almunia (2011).   
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years on private persons that have played a decisive role within the anticompetitive infringe-
ment.17 While other countries also have this kind of penalty at their disposal18, this possibility 
does not exist in the European Commission (hereafter: EC) law and in Germany, even though 
there are some calls for this penalty19. 
The following chart gives an overview of enacted antirust handlings of the aforementioned 
competition authorities:  
Country
/Region 
Cartel fines Damage compensation 
 Reference 
point 




Germany20 Turnover (up to 
30% of the turnover 
achieved during 
and from the in-
fringement) 
Companies 
10% of the turnover achieved 
in the previous business year or 
of the turnover achieved from 
the infringement. Multiplica-
tion factor that accounts for 
the size of the company. 
Private individual 
Up to € 1 m. 
Whoever intentionally 
or negligently commits 
an infringement 




jurisdiction (June 2011) 
EU21 Value of sales (up 
to 30% of 
the value of sales) 
Companies 
10 % of the total turnover in 
the preceding business year 
“Everyone who has 
suffered harm because 
of an infringement of 
Article 101 or 102 
TFEU has a right to be 
compensated for that 
harm.”22 
Permitted 
Introduced in the 
course of EC’s White 
Book publication (April 
2008) 
U.S.23 Highest value of: 
1. Point system 
(based on offense 
level and criminal 
history determi-
nation) 
2. Pecuniary gain 
3. Pecuniary loss 
Companies 
Highest value of: 
1. U.S. $ 100 m 
2. Twice the gross gain 
3. Twice the gross loss 
Private Individual 
Highest value of: 
1. U.S. $ 1 m 
2. Twice the gross gain 
3. Twice the gross loss 
4. Imprisonment not exceeding 
10 years 
 Prohibited 
Under Federal Law 
Illinois Brick Doctrine 
 
Possible under State 
Law 
 
2.4 Private Damage Claims 
A further clear distinction must be drawn between the fines assessed and imposed by a 
competition authority in the course of an antitrust procedure and the actual damage a cartel 
17  Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237 § 215(a), 118 
Stat. 668 (2004). 
18  Up to day: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, Thai-
land, and Zambia, see Shaffer and Nesbitt (2011), p. 8. 
19  See e.g. Wagner-von Papp (2010). 
20  See Bundeskartellamt (2006), GWB (2012), BGH (2011), and Bundeskartellamt (2013). 
21  See European Union (2006), European Commission (2008). 
22  European Union (2011), Part 1, I, A, 1. 
23  See United States Sentencing Commission (2012), and USC (2012). 
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has inflicted on its (direct and indirect) customers. The latter can actually exceed, and regu-
larly do exceed in Europe, the former to a large extent.  
The fines a competition authority imposes on cartel members, after having been informed 
or found out about the infringement in the first place, are based on the focal points pre-
sented in the table above. In the EU, whereupon this paper mainly focuses, thus the turnover. 
The EC has pushed the enforceability of private damage claims within cartel procedures ve-
hemently in recent years. Within its White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules24 from 2008, the EC states that every victim of anticompetitive behavior has 
to have the possibility to claim reparation from the responsible companies. In practice, there 
are still numerous legal uncertainties that must be overcome in order to increase the number 
of private damage claims. The EC just recently proposed legislation that aims at facilitating 
private damage claims, in which it also focuses on damage quantification in order to give 
guidance to courts and affected parties.25 
The amount of damage a claimant can sue for can be calculated in different ways.26 What 
should be emphasized at this point is that the damage might have occurred on the direct 
buyer’s side and on the indirect buyer’s side.27 The indirect customer of a cartelized good, 
who bought the very same thing from the direct cartel’s customer at increased prices, might 
(depending on the respective legal jurisdiction) also have the right to demand for its dam-
ages.28 When cartelized companies try to lessen their own cartel damage in court with the 
aforementioned price increase distributions, this is called the passing-on defense.  
The European Court of Justice strengthened the passing-on effect within the EU in its 
Manfredi judgment by stating that any individual has to have the possibility to claim dam-
ages before national courts; thus also indirect customers.29 The ORWI judgment of the Fed-
eral Court of Justice can be seen as a landmark decision in Germany.30 The Court therein 
states that indirect buyers can also claim compensation, and that this might even be advan-
tageous for the cartelists themselves (as they can allege the passing-on defense against direct 
claimants), as long as this does not finally result in not having to pay any compensation at 
all or too little. The burden of proof lies with the cartel members.31 Nevertheless, private 
damage claims, no matter if instituted by direct or indirect customers, are quiet troublesome, 
which is due to its very nature.  
Deterrence is the overall objective of the world’s antitrust regimes.32 The threat to have to 
pay substantial compensation for violations of antitrust rules, either to the particular com-
petition authority or the private aggrieved parties, might already discourage the respective 
24  See European Commission (2008). 
25  See European Commission (2013a).  
26  The next chapter of this paper takes a closer look at quantification methods for the „real value“.  
27  As already mentioned in section: 2.2 Three cartel effects. 
28  In this case the direct customer either suffers only part of the whole cartel damage or no damage 
at all. The latter case will only occur under very specific demand conditions in the downstream 
market. For further information, see e.g. Davis and Garcés (2011), p. 368 et seqq. 
29  See European Court of Justice (2006), Point 61.  
30  See BGH (2011). 
31  See Kirchhoff (2012), p. 927 et seqq.  
32  See amongst others Connor (2009). 
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companies from cartelization.33 The deterrence effect of private damage claims is one rea-
son, amongst others, why the EC is so heavily trying to advance private damage claims in 
cartel cases. An increase of this number would also lead to additional deterrence effects for 
future (potential) infringements. Private claimants constitute private supplements to public 
cartel law infringements within this context.34  
3. Methods of Quantifying Cartel Damages  
3.1 Literature on quantification approaches 
As damage quantification executions are conducted more and more frequently, scientific 
and economic literature with focus on the different approaches has accumulated within the 
last years. Several studies present quantification methods in a manner similar to the analysis 
presented in this paper.  
Ashurst (2004) were the first one to compile a cartel damage quantification study for the 
EC, which gives a very structured overview of the court decisions at the time of examination. 
Oxera (2009) also prepared a damage quantification study on behalf of the EC aiming at 
shedding some light on this untransparent area from both legal and economic perspectives. 
The study differentiates between comparator-based, financial-analysis-based, and market-
structure-based approaches, describes the counterfactual foundation of each approach, and 
categorizes the available techniques. Even though giving a sound and broad overview of the 
field of quantification approaches and adding various practical examples from cartel cases 
throughout the EU, both studies do not go into econometric detail.  
Connor (2009) examines the antitrust litigation of the lysine cartel rather intensively and 
points to quantification problems as he emphasizes that the before and after method is 
rather critical in cases in which cartel formation took place after a recession (which appears 
to be a frequent situation) and under such circumstances the benchmark might be under-
stated and damages overstated, et vice versa. Connor (2001) is a kind of predecessor to the 
aforementioned article.  
Dijk and Verboven (2008) also distinguish between damage quantification methods that use 
comparator indicators and methods that are based on direct information about the cartel-
ized market. They also introduce critical loss analysis as one approach belonging to the latter 
category. By determining the break-even point at which demand decreases given a particular 
price increase and comparing this to the expected actual loss, cartel price overcharges can 
be calculated.  
33  The deterring effect of cartel fines is a wide-raging scientific study area. Various studies come to 
the conclusion that the deterring effects of corporate penalties indeed have been sub-optimal dur-
ing the last years, and that competition authorities have to employ detection in addition to deter-
rence mechanisms. See e.g. Connor (2009) or Hüschelrath and Weigand (2010). 
34   Private litigation might also be regarded as a process generating extra costs, next to the already 




                                                          
 
 
Davis and Garcés (2010) study the very same approaches (partially with different naming) 
from a straight practical, partially econometrics-based perspective. They give numerous ex-
amples and graphics arising from practical court proceedings for which cartel damages have 
been calculated. They furthermore explain the approaches’ basic idea and effects by indica-
tive formulas. Friederiszick and Röller (2010) also briefly broach the subject of quantification 
methods. Their examination is based on data and experiences from the German cement car-
tel case. They demonstrate the general trade-off between accuracy and practicability in cartel 
cases (see: 3.3 Accuracy vs. practicability). Fumagalli et al. (2010) screen quantification meth-
ods on cases of infringement of Article 102 TFEU and thus deal with abuse of a market 
dominant position. They point to the differences that arise from foreclosure rather than from 
collusion, which are mainly due to the fact that foreclosure may indeed affect both custom-
ers and competitors in contrast to cartels which mainly affect customers on different value-
added steps.  
Kneuper and Langenfeld (2011) primarily contrast the approach of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines with the determination of volume of commerce affected in cartel procedures 
(thus the damage caused by the anticompetitive infringement), and derive their advantages 
and disadvantages. When presenting different economic quantification methods they also 
introduce natural experiments as an approach to determine or verify the but-for market out-
comes, and depict advancement in the difference methods by customer differentiation 
(groups of customers or even individual ones).  
Inderst et al. (2013a) firstly examine, which kind of damages can be caused by a cartel and 
in which direction on the upstream as well as downstream level they have an impact. They 
also focus on harm resulting from abusive behavior of a firm holding a dominant position 
and further aspects of damage estimation, such as the discounting of damages and after-
effects. 
The paper at hand pursues an all-inclusive aim by addressing both public and private anti-
trust enforcement. By focusing on the latter it presents cartel damage quantification meth-
ods and the research on this topic in its contemporary entirety.  
 
3.2 Damage Quantification with Empirical Methods 
Collusive behavior, irrelevant whether price- or quota-fixing cartels as well as market sharing 
agreements, regularly increases price levels though the magnitude of effects differs. Empiri-
cal examinations in the scientific literature try to assess the average price increases of cartels. 
Connor and Bolotova (2006) for example take more than 800 cartels during the last 125 
years as the basis for their empirical estimation. They come to the conclusion that the mean 
value of cartel overcharge equals to 29%, and the median equals to 18%.35 Lande and Con-
nor (2008) estimate an average cartel price increase of 31% to 49%, and a median over-
charge within the range of 22% to 25% in a subsequent survey. 
35  Other empirical papers come to far higher overcharge estimation results. E.g. Connor and Lande 
(2006): The overcharge of European cartels ranges between 28 % and 54 %. Whereas country-
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For quantifying the actual damage for the cartel’s purchaser(s), there are different ap-
proaches that are discussed within academic studies (see section above), as well as practically 
applied in damage suits.36 The following analysis will demonstrate the most common tech-
niques, and will discuss each one’s advantages and disadvantages. Each of these approaches 
aims at revealing the price that would have emerged under competitive conditions, the so-
called counterfactual but-for the anticompetitive infringement. All of them are based on 
some economic models derived from the specific cartel case, even though to varying degrees. 
Difference methods are indeed of highest importance in damage quantification. 
The damage estimated by means of these approaches would always be a lower bound of 
the true harm caused, as reduced quantities and the resulting deadweight loss are not taken 
into account.37 Potential dynamic effects of anticompetitive behavior, such as less innovation 
and reduced R&D dynamics and a consequent loss of diversity and product quality, as well 
as market foreclosure, might only be speculatively measured and therefore primarily incor-
porated as expectations.  
The following analysis of cartel damage quantification measures is structured in a twofold 
way: First, basic information regarding each approach’s attempt will be presented. Second, 
each quantification measure is examined with regards to different criteria. From a content-
related viewpoint, the four analysis criteria are focusing on the following dimensions: 
• data requirements: This analytical dimension is decisive for the implementation of each 
quantification method. Degrees and extent of required company or market data varies 
heavily from method to method. If necessary data are not available, the envisaged ap-
proach is not practicable. The criterion of data requirement also encompasses the aspect 
of time for data assembly and thus includes a cost factor for quantification execution. It 
serves as the basis criterion for each further content-related examination.  
• adequateness of prediction: When deciding about the level of detail for overcharge 
quantification, it can be helpful to first get an idea about the damage extent rather than 
directly estimating the counterfactual but-for the infringement as elaborately and real-
istically as possible. Some quantification methods demand less data and do not take 
specific market circumstances into account. Some estimate the competitive counterfac-
tual by either drawing on large databases and/or developing sophisticated competitive 
market models. Adequateness of prediction is lower for the first ones and higher for the 
latter ones. This criterion is thus about the quality of damage prediction that is highly 
case-dependent.  
• restrictions and difficulties: This examination dimension focusses on limitations of each 
estimation method’s implementation that either derive from its practical execution or 
from scientific research. Limitations can occur due to restrictive underlying assumptions 
or they e.g. depict constraints for economists as they are not practicable to implement 
market specific characteristic, which would have been fundamental to adequately model 
this market.  
specific cartels exhibited lower overcharges which range between 16 % and 48 %. Still, criticism 
on all of these results was offered. 
36  Prior to the Guidelines on the method of setting fines, the estimation of cartel fines by European 
competition authorities has also been based on these approaches (see: European Union (2006), as 
already mentioned above.  
37  For literature analyzing the problem of deadweight loss resulting from cartel infringements, see 
e.g. Davis and Garcés (2010). 
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• extensions: Extensions of the various quantification approaches, examined in the follow-
ing, have been developed from scientific researchers and/or practitioners. They regularly 
present an advancement of the initial version with regards to implementation, in a prac-
tical sense, e.g. combination of quantification or econometric methods, or with regards 
to the counterfactual result’s adequateness of prediction.  
The second analysis dimension focusses on application-related criteria, which are: 
• practicability aspects: This analysis focusses on the practical implementation of each 
quantification method for economists in terms of e.g. time effort, training requirements, 
and econometric understanding.  
• transparency for non-economists: As it is mentioned in the majority of the cartel damage 
quantification literature, it is of particular importance that but-for results are tangible 
and understandable for non-economists. Courts, lawyers, and procedure parties that are 
non-economists are regularly the target group for which damage quantification has 
been prepared. They thus have to be able to understand the quantification results as 
well as the economic path towards them. Transparency varies from method to method 
and can respectively has to be increased by either graphically illustrating them or ex-
plaining the underlying mathematics in great detail. 
• importance in executed antitrust litigations: This criterion stands for each approach’s 
application in (major) antitrust court procedures, in the past. It shows the importance 
in real-world damage calculation, not only in theory. 
The importance of compliance regarding the different criteria differs from approach to ap-
proach and is highly case dependent. This will be emphasized within each examination. 
When analyzing the different methods, it should be recalled that each one’s ability to ade-
quately measure the cartel induced price increase is highly dependent upon how precisely 
and reliably it can separate between collusive effects, on the one hand, and from other, 
exogenous effects that are not related to the anticompetitive conduct, on the other hand. 
 
3.2.1 Before and After Approaches 
Basic Information  
The principal approach when calculating the damages induced by a specific cartel is the 
difference method. The before and after approaches are time series based approaches that 
simply compare prices from different periods before, after, and during the cartel. This ap-
proach is one variant of difference methods. Its result then depicts the case specific cartel 
overcharge. The focus is on differences in prices within determined time horizons in order to 
find out about the hypothetical counterfactual. Following temporal horizons are possible: 
• Before and during: When applying these time horizons, the approach compares the 
prices of the temporarily cartelized product before the beginning of the effective collu-
sive agreements with prices that were set during the cartel period. 
• During and after: The second period under consideration defines the timeframe relevant 
for benchmarking as during and after the cartel period. 
• Before, during, and after: This third time horizon compares the prices of the relevant 
product before, during, and after the cartelized period.38 
38  For this definition of possible temporal horizons, see Oxera (2009), p. V. 
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The estimated differences between the determined temporal horizons thus represent the 
result of the damage quantification; the cartel overcharge. This is the price increase due to 
the anticompetitive infringement in comparison to the hypothetical price under competitive 
conditions.39 The assumption taken as a basis in these quantification approaches is that the 
benchmark periods represent reasonable prices that would have emerged under perfect 
competition.   
Content Analysis 
From a content specific point of view this approach indeed presents the simplest of all meth-
ods analyzed within this paper. Only few data are basically necessary in order to achieve a 
result. Gathering determined time horizons as benchmark periods with regard to the price 
but-for the infringement is an adequate way in cartel cases that are timely definite and that 
have not lasted long. Also, significant market changes40 should not have been taken place 
within this demarcation horizon. Transforming the before and after approach into a simple 
regression framework with a dummy variable can substantiate the quantification results, 
especially with regard to taking external influence factors into account (see section 3.2.4 
Price Prediction).  
When applying time-based comparisons, some principal prerequisites exist that are some-
times hard to fulfill: The beginning of the cartel might be hard to define (especially in cases 
in which the prices do not directly increase to a substantial degree). The end of a cartel as 
well as the time before might be characterized by intensive competition between the market 
players or recessionary periods, which in turn would lead to higher overcharge calculations 
as their basis is not a sustainable price41.42 Market prices, which are cartel-biased or not col-
lusion-free, might be gathered rather than actual comparable ones. Nevertheless, it is regu-
larly less difficult to identify when the cartel ended than when it started, especially in cases 
where it had been detected by a competition authority or revealed by a crown witness. But 
a cartel break-down might in turn only last for a short period and restart its anticompetitive 
behavior at a later date either explicitly or tacitly.43 The main problem of establishing the 
exact cartel period may be overcome with an extension of the approach which lies in a sta-
tistical determination of the beginning and the end of the cartel period with an exogenous 
structural break analysis.44 
The requirements listed above also reveal the difficulties and constraints of the method. 
Market prices are always influenced by various market characteristics. Small changes in de-
mand, capacity or the number of market players can already lead to significant changes in 
price. It is thus very important for an adequate benchmark price, when applying the before 
39  See Davis and Garcés (2010), p. 354 et seqq.  
40  Changes in market characteristics such as: Demand growth, capacity changes, market entries, etc. 
41  Sustainable prices are a prerequisite to comparative methods. The Federal Court of Justice (of Ger-
many) explains in its ORWI-judgment that appropriate comparative prices are those that arise from 
functioning markets that yield prices, which reflect a market-compliant interaction of supply and 
demand. See Bundesgerichtshof (2007). From an economic point of view, this corresponds to a 
price that is higher than the company’s marginal costs and thus (partially) covers fixed costs. 
42  See Inderst et al. (2013a), p. 24 et seq., and Connor (2009), p. 313. 
43  See Nieberding (2006), p. 370, and Kneuper and Langenfeld (2011).  
44  See Dijk and Verboven (2008), p. 2337. 
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and after method, that few or no market changes occurred within the defined timely hori-
zons. When changes in important market features eventuated, it is necessary that these also 
play a role during the cartel period in order to have the same market environment. Otherwise 
one would compare apples and oranges and the but-for price would be misleading.  
Further limitations of this approach are that the prices during the cartel period are assumed 
to be constant and stable, but price influencing changes always occur (even in the most 
stable or traditional markets) and influence even the cartel price level (especially in long-
lasting collusive agreements), and that every purchaser of the cartelized good pays the same 
price. No differences in customers, the resulting differences in bargaining power, and the 
consequent differences in prices between individual customer groups are taken into account. 
This kind of difference method solely considers average price levels.45  
Application Analysis 
The before and after method, is very simple in application, assumed that at least some data 
in the determined time horizons are available. Results from this approach illustrated in a 
graphical way are especially transparent for every addressee, which is particularly important 
for courts and lawyers in damage suits. Before and after methods are frequently used in 
cartel law proceedings due to the methods’ practicability. This has been the case within the 
prominent lawsuits of the uranium cartel46 as well as the lysine cartel47 and the paper whole-
saler cartel in Germany.48  
Summing up and from an economist point of view, the before and after approach should 
basically be considered as simple check tests in order to find out about the approximate 
extent of cartel damage. It may provide a sufficiently sound proximity in cartel cases that are 
stable. More sophisticated methods should be used to gather precise damage information. 
 
3.2.2 Yardstick Approaches 
Basic Information 
The second difference method, the yardstick approach, aims at quantifying the cartel dam-
age by comparing collusive prices with prices that in fact exist in other competitive markets. 
It is thus also based on the difference method but includes a regional background. The 
45  See e.g. Ashurst (2004). p. 17 et seqq. 
46  Uranium cartel: The uranium cartel has been built by the five major uranium producing nations 
(governments and companies) of the world, namely Canada, Australia, France, England, and South 
Africa within the 1970’s. It is interestingly very hard for a researcher to find out about deep details 
of the case. 
47  The lysine cartel has been organized by five companies on an international basis and took place in 
the mid 1990’s. The U.S. company Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) as well as two Japanese and 
Korean companies raised the price of the animal feed additive lysine. The cartel was organized by 
means of at least 25 multiparty price-fixing meetings. It ended with an FBI raid in June 1995. The 
EC imposed fines on the cartel members that amount to € 109.9 million in June 2000. The overall 
monetary penalties for the cartelists total € 305 million. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-00-589_en.htm?locale=FR, or Connor (2009). 
48  See e.g. Davis and Garcés (2010) for the illustration within the uranium cartel procedure, and 
Connor (2009) with regard to the lysine cartel.  
13 
 
                                                          
benchmark market should be one with a comparable market situation (with regard to de-
mand, cost structures, etc.), but obviously without collusive agreements. As a general rule, 
the following product-regions-combinations are plausible for the yardstick approach: 
• Comparison of the same product in different geographical regions: Prices of the same 
product within clearly separate regional markets in different geographical areas are con-
trasted. This is the yardstick approach typically applied 
• Comparison of different product markets in the same geographical region: This bench-
mark market should be used in order to find out about specific product characteristics 
within identical regional conditions. 
• Comparison of different products in different geographical regions: In case (cartel-free) 
comparison elements are neither available for the product of focus nor the geographical 
market, one could draw on substitutive products within a comparable but geographically 
different market.49 
Yardstick comparisons are primarily used for quantifying the damage of a cartelized product 
in connection with the same product in competitive benchmark markets that are certainly 
not infected by such an infringement and that exhibit similar market characteristics. Within 
such a constellation this approach is quite a simple and helpful tool. 
Content Analysis 
Data requirements are limited in order to conduct such method and, given the benchmark 
product and/or market is indeed highly comparable with regard to its main characteristics, 
the implementation is comparatively easy and can be carried out quickly. Results can illus-
trate the market results of industries in other countries, of different demand models or di-
vergent market shares. They can furthermore estimate bidding outcomes in markets that are 
not cartel inflicted. 
The yardstick approach includes limitations analogue to the constraints of the first difference 
method; the before and after approach. The differences, standing for the induced cartel 
damage or overcharge, estimated by yardstick methods are easily prone to error. A control 
for differences that are naturally inherent in different geographical markets or products is 
necessary. Similar technologies, cost structures and demand conditions are needed. Espe-
cially in comparison cases of international markets, influence factors such as effects of ex-
change rates on cost, prices, and profits limit these approaches applicability.50 Furthermore, 
it can never be guaranteed that the benchmark is indeed cartel-free or cartel-unbiased. 
Therefore, indirect cartel effects also need to be eliminated. As an appropriate yardstick 
product is highly likely to be a substitute for the cartelized product, it might be an insur-
mountable task to find a benchmark product that is unaffected by the anticompetitive agree-
ment.51 
Further explainable factors that possibly influence price changes on the cartelized market 
can be corrected for by transforming the yardstick approach into a multivariate regression, 
comparable to the extension of the before and after method52 (see 3.2.4 Price Prediction). 
49  For this differentiation, see Ashurst (2004), p. 19. 
50  See Ashurst (2004), p. 19. 
51  See Connor (2009), p. 322. 
52  The main difference to the above mentioned regression is that the dummy variable identifies the 
cartelized market rather than the timeframe of the cartel.  
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The assumption underlying this approach is that all differences in prices, which cannot be 
explained by exogenous influence factors, can directly be traced back to the anticompetitive 
behavior and thus present the overcharge.53 This might still be very assumption-based but 
with a higher explanatory power. 
The combination of yardstick competition and the before and after approach yields an often 
referred to advancement, which is called the difference-in-differences method. It offers the 
possibility of a panel of time series with cross-sectional data, and actually increases both 
approaches’ validity. The aim is to increase the adequateness of prediction regarding the 
cartel overcharge by considering a double difference building. The price increase on the 
benchmark market stands for the regular or normal price increase that would have occurred 
under competitive conditions on the cartelized market, and which is therefore not attributed 
to the anticompetitive agreements. This approach is useful for twofold corrections, calculat-
ing overcharges and assessing causality.54 
Application Analysis 
Yardstick methods are comparatively easy and quickly to implement. The challenge for econ-
omists is reduced, assuming that reliable data are available. The transparency of yardstick 
results is similar to the one of the before and after approach as the underlying assumptions 
are easy to grasp and graphical illustration is possible. The Court of France used the yardstick 
approach in order to estimate cartel overcharges in the Lescarcelle-De Memoris and OGF 
cartel case as well as the German Federal Court of Justice in the paper wholesaler cartel to 
assess the cartel gain for quantifying the cartelists’ fines. 
In reality, the difference-in-differences method is rather error-prone as the requirements that 
need to be fulfilled are demanding. Time series data for both the cartelized market and the 
benchmark market are needed. It might be impossible to find a yardstick benchmark that is 
adequate in terms of comparability and not affected by the cartel in any form. Nevertheless, 
the frequency of use in executed cartel cases shows the importance of this approach, which 
is mainly due to the approach’s simplicity and plausibility. This seems to be a good compro-
mise between sophistication, reliability and feasibility. 
 
3.2.3 Cost-based Approaches 
Basic Information 
Cost-based approaches are based on financial information of an industry or company and 
depict bottom-up analyses for identifying the but-for price. By taking relevant cost input 
factors of the product of emphasis into account and adding a reasonable profit margin (one 
that would have emerged under competitive conditions on the relevant market), benchmark 
prices of per unit costs can be derived.55  
53  See Inderst et al. (2013a), p. 30.  
54  See Fumagalli et al. (2010), p. 10. 
55  See Friederiszick and Röller (2010), p. 12. 
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More precisely, one gathers production costs information from accounting data from inter-
nal management reports and divides the total production costs by the total units of output. 
The difference of the detected cartel price per unit and the estimated per unit costs plus 
price-cost margin thus reflects the cartel overcharge per unit.56 
Content Analysis 
Data requirements are high for this approach and very time-consuming. The aim of this bot-
tom-up method is to build cost functions. For econometrically deriving such kind of cost 
functions, there is a basic need of cost data. Alternatively production and input demand 
information can be used or be relevant. This actually depends on the respective business 
model of the company concerned (self-production, agent, etc.). A clear definition of costs is 
decisive for a cost-based method’s accuracy and validity. 
There are several positive facts that must be attributed to cost-based methods. They are quiet 
simple to implement as for the most part, solely per unit costs and an adequate mark-up 
reflecting specific market conditions are required. It is already possible to quantify the cartel 
overcharge with these two elements. Accounting information is inherently collected by com-
panies.  
A possible extension of the original approach lies in drawing on price-cost margins directly 
in contrast to estimating the counterfactual prices and quantities. A margin increase might 
be an indicator for the damage. Especially for cartels on input markets, it will regularly be 
the case that cartelists’ profits increase and those of the direct purchaser decrease. It can be 
assumed that the major part of damage caused will result from a transfer of wealth from 
the purchaser to the infringing company.57   
These approaches are obviously based on cost information. The main difficulty in this context 
is to find robust cost estimates, and even more essential accounting costs are not necessarily 
identical to economic costs. They can indeed differ dramatically. Accountants deduct a share 
of the initial investment for each year (either as a constant or a decreasing rate), and write 
the capital off. Economists focus on the actual value that could be achieved on the market 
of the investment good, and contrast this with the original capital investment. Accounting 
depreciation is rarely smaller than zero in contrast to an economic one that can readily be 
negative when assets appreciate in value.58 
Next to the divergence in cost definitions, there are some further problems with the cost-
based approaches. It is assumed that competitive costs and the relevant margins will be 
constant over the determined time horizon. No changes in market characteristics are taken 
into account.59 As already emphasized for the before and after as well as the yardstick meth-
ods, the counterfactual price should be one that would emerge under full competition; i.e. 
56  See Ashurst (2004), p. 19 et seqq. 
57  E.g. CAPM models or LRAIC models can be drawn on to in order to measure a company’s profita-
bility. See Inderst et al. (2013a), p. 29. 
58  See Davis and Garcés, (2010). p. 125 et seqq. 






                                                          
 
 
even though oligopolistic competition might be more likely and appropriate for the market 
of concern, the fully competitive price is alleged to be the proper benchmark. In an oligopoly 
without any collusive agreement, prices may be above the per unit production costs of per-
fect competition simply due to the nature of this specific market type.60 Models taking full 
competition as a basis and considering significant product differentiation or heterogeneous 
products are not applicable either, these markets are however less prone to cartelization. 
Application Analysis 
The lack of understanding or replicability concerning these cost measures’ results, and the 
regularly occurring non-comprehensibility for non-economists is a huge disadvantage in 
practice. Determining a reasonable price-profit margin regularly depicts challenging tasks 
for economists. Determining this decisive influence factor objectively might be impossible. 
In trying to do so, a proper understanding of the relevant firm and market is necessary. 
Simulating market conditions and company data without a collusive agreement may require 
a high degree of empirical data and the assessment of the specific company’s and product-
specific margins.61 These requirements increase these methods’ probability of becoming very 
time consuming and impracticable. Cost-based quantification has been exercised by the 
Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf within a foreclosure case of municipal works.62  
But cost-based prices may actually be a good proxy for competitive market prices in sectors 
in which there is a clear or comparatively constant relationship between prices and costs. 
That is to say in sectors that exhibit market prices, which are indeed cost-based and do not 
solely follow the forces of demand and supply. This pricing especially occurs in mass markets. 
However, in most cases a competitive price equal to costs cannot be assumed to be the 
appropriate benchmark as no such clear relationship between prices and costs exists. Already 
in oligopolistic markets, a price equal to average unit is likely not to occur. 
Even though cost-based approaches definitively suffer some disadvantages, these methods’ 
importance and practicability should nevertheless not be underestimated. Cost-based ap-
proaches can be used in cases, where company data are not available. There are statistical 
offices that regularly ascertain production data of main input goods. Economists can make 














60  See Dijk and Verboven (2008), p. 2338 et seqq. 
61  See Friederiszick and Röller (2010), p. 12. 
62  For further information regarding this case, see:  
 http://www.energieverbraucher.de/files_db/1310984811_2652__12.pdf (accessed: August 2013). 
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which there is a (huge) lack of company data emerge more often for economists than out-
siders might think. Nevertheless, to estimate a specific company’s margin can be an approx-
imation only and can only come close to reality by taking the whole market and the form of 
competition into account; thus also the margins of rivals. 
 
3.2.4 Price Prediction 
Basic Information 
A more elaborated approach than and an advancement of the before and after or yardstick 
methods is the one of price prediction. It is the first quantification approach introduced 
within this paper that is not limited to a perfectly competitive market for the price bench-
mark but includes oligopolistic behavior for the relevant market players within the non-co-
operative comparative market by using direct information concerning the relevant market 
and including it into structural modeling. 
Price prediction is based on regression analysis and thus depicts an ideal statistically robust 
approach to calculate the counterfactual. Drawing on regression-based methods allows for 
correcting for various influence factors (by taking them as independent variables into the 
regression) without any constraint. Pricing influence factors, such as demand changes, sup-
ply side coefficients or global prices for input goods and indexes for global economic devel-
opment can be taken into account in order to adequately calculate the but-for price. The 
statistic approach thereby allows for estimating in a systematic way. 
Basically, there are two main econometric specification models that are used within the an-
ticompetitive context: 
1. Dummy variable model: Taking the price as the dependent variable that should be ex-
plained, this model considers demand side and supply side factors as the pivotal coeffi-
cients that influence the price; the independent variables. A dummy variable is considered 
moreover. This dummy is a binary variable that can only take on the value 0 in times 
before or after the cartel period, or 1 during the cartel. The dummy thus accounts for the 
period of present collusive agreements. If the dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant, it determines the average cartel overcharge.63 The dummy variable is thus sup-
posed to capture the unexplained price increases that occurred during the cartel period. 
This kind of econometric specification assigns an average amount of the cartel overcharge 
to all years of the cartel. This restriction indeed shows one of the limitations of this ap-
proach.64 
2. Residual model: This multivariate approach estimates the overcharge by forecasting the 
price that would have emerged during the determined cartel period without collusion. 
This forecast is based on pre- and post-cartel data, and on deriving effects of cost and 
demand shifters on the price. So, the estimated coefficients and the real world values of 
the independent variables during the alleged cartel period are used for quantifying the 
but-for price. The overcharge is eventually determined by the difference of actual cartel 
63  See Veljanovski (2007), p. 15.  
64  See Davis and Garcés (2010), p. 357. 
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prices and the counterfactual, taken the quantity sold into account.65 The distinction or 
advancement to the above described before and after and yardstick approaches lies in 
the fact that a multivariate regression forecast allows to correct for changes in market 
characteristics, such as shifts in demand and supply. Nevertheless, it is still assumed that 
the structural relationships within the relevant market remain constant over time.66 
If the dummy variable approach allows covariates to differ over time and if quantities are 
the same or regressions are quantity-weighted within the forecast approach, these two price 
prediction methods’ results will even be numerically equivalent.67 
Content Analysis 
Price prediction used for cartel damage quantification requires a very large data base. Pro-
vided that the various case data needed are available, it is possible to consider various market 
influence factors in contrast to most of the comparative approaches. Econometric ap-
proaches are the ones that are able to adequately calibrate a probable “real world”. 
On the downside, the potentially large amount of market influence factors taken into ac-
count might also pose significant challenges. For different overcharges each year or chang-
ing market characteristics, more elaborated regressions should be performed, their results 
should be compared with the initial ones from the dummy regression, and the robustness 
of the latter should be proven. Market players’ possibly changing conducts within the deter-
mined time horizon are by no means taken into account.  
Economists have to be very careful when assessing the adequateness of independent varia-
bles. Even very robust results are not necessarily meaningful for the relevant market. It is 
important not to include irrelevant independent explanation variables to the regression, and 
particularly misdirecting ones in case that these variables are correlated with the dummy 
variable. There are some common problems that might arise in multivariate regressions, such 
as misspecification, endogeneity, multicollinearity, and measurement errors.68 In order to 
overcome the obstacle of nonstationarity in the data, which indeed may lead to erroneous 
results, such as that the variables’ relation to each other might only be due to correlation 
with an omitted variable, an error correction model can be implemented. This model might 
also correct for short-term dynamics.69 
Application Analysis 
Econometric models for price prediction enjoy great popularity in antitrust procedures. For 
adequate parameterization, extensive knowledge of the relevant market and its institutions 
as well as facts of the case of interest is indispensable. Tests of robustness should always be 
performed after having conducted small changes in specifications. However, no econometric 
analysis will ever be completely robust and free of potential misspecification. This fact makes 
these approaches particularly vulnerable towards courts, judges and regulation institutions. 
65  See Veljanovski (2007), p. 15. 
66  See Davis and Garcés (2010), p. 357 et seqq.  
67  See McCrary and Rubinfeld (2012). 
68  For detailed information regarding these problems, see e.g. Davis and Garcés (2010), p. 81 et seqq.  
69  For further information regarding the error correction model, see e.g. Nieberding (2006), p. 375 
et seqq.  
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They might also have large difficulties to interpret regression results, assess the specifica-
tions, and understand the application of the specific techniques. Economists need to be very 
educated with this kind of econometric model-building and have to prepare very good doc-
umentations for increasing this approach’s replicability. The dummy variable approach is 
particularly important in but-for estimations. The residual model is mainly used as a forecast 
model, which is only based on pre-cartel data and not on post-cartel ones.  
The ability of price prediction to accurately assess the cartel induced price increase is highly 
dependent on the analysis’ ability to separate between the cartel effect on price develop-
ments and influence factors that are completely unaffected by the anticompetitive agree-
ments. Given that a lot of data is available, and economists are very well educated and ac-
quainted with the econometric challenges, price-prediction has the possibility to model the 
counterfactual world accurately, which is especially due to possible corrections in market 
changes and oligopolistic market forms.   
 
3.2.5 Simulation Approaches 
Basic Information 
Simulation approaches have been typically applied in merger simulation procedures70 and 
have only more recently been implemented in cartel damage calculations. These economic 
models aim at calculating the relevant market data of costs, prices, quantities, and profits 
with and without collusive agreements within different time horizons (maximum before, 
during, and after the cartel). They are based on industrial organization theory.  
An economic equilibrium model is designed that determines the particular market conditions 
(such as demand, elasticities, costs, marginal costs, prices, and quantities) for the cartelized 
market in question and taking oligopolistic behavior of market players as a presumption. By 
feeding data (without relying on cost data of the alleged companies) regarding decisive pa-
rameters, such as price and cost elasticites as well as market shares, into the model, structural 
information of particular market outcomes result. After having specified the relevant market 
and company designs, a market simulation tool can calculate but-for price simulations, e.g. 
how would the counterfactual have changed in case the cartel’s duration would have been 
longer/shorter. The application of simulation tools thus offers the possibility to calculate car-
tel margins and non-cooperative ones without the need to mainly rely on cost data (delivered 
by accused firms).  
Content Analysis 
Given that relevant market and company specific data are indeed available and reliable; var-
ious empirical or econometrical techniques can be implemented into simulation methods. 
All individual parameters determining the simulation tool can be adjusted in a way so that 
replication of “real world” data can be achieved as approximative as possible (so-called cal-
ibration).71 The decision needs to be made whether Bertrand or Cournot competition should 
70  See e.g. Budzinski and Ruhmer (2010). 
71  See Friederiszick and Röller (2010), p. 11 et seq.  
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be assumed, in advance of running the simulation tool. Price competition following the Ber-
trand model is typically alleged for the market players’ behavior and thus for the resulting 
simulated prices, both in pre- and post-merger periods.72 Taking the particular market cir-
cumstances and participating companies behavior into account should be decisive for this 
decision. 
Nevertheless, there are also some intrinsic challenges in market simulation approaches. Spec-
ifying oligopolistic behavior for the simulation tools is an obstacle, and profound market 
understanding is a pivotal prerequisite for that. This is one difficulty often referred to in the 
scientific literature. Some main market characteristics can facilitate implicit collusion; high 
barriers to entry, high market concentration, homogenous products, and numerous dis-
persed purchasers are pivotal in this context.73 An oligopolistic structure of an industry can 
thus tend to lead to implicit coordination of prices, resulting in higher prices than the long 
run competitive price, even without an explicit anticompetitive agreement.74 Market simula-
tion is still based on economists’ assumptions on how the market works and especially on 
how it would have developed without the anticompetitive infringement.  
Counterfactuals can also be derived from accounting cost data plus calculated competitive 
margins, when combining the simulation with the cost-based approaches.75 Market simula-
tions in combination with cost-based approaches are particularly useful under specific cir-
cumstances, as they additionally encompass firm inherent information and alleviate the pit-
falls of cost-based prices by providing a market mechanism that determines prices. 
Application Analysis 
The implementation of simulation methods is accepted to be useful in merger analysis. Sim-
ulation methods focus on a particular market form and do not necessarily take a competitive 
benchmark for granted. A great advantage of these approaches lies in their transparency. 
The person trying to comprehend the damage calculation results can do so very easily, as 
one has only to take a look at the underlying economic assumptions. These as well as further 
assumed market parameters that are crucial for the outcome are always transparently out-
lined and easily understandable. 
Simulation approaches are regularly very time-consuming, as extensive data are required in 
order to achieve robustness in estimation results, and these are one hundred per cent based 
on assumptions. The calculation results may be very sensitive to the underlying assumptions 
and simulation tool programming decisions. Thus the economic model on how competition 
takes place between market participants and how they react to competitors’ business deci-
sions can only be based on parameterization decisions of economists. But indeed, this ap-
proach is comparatively straightforward to a professional economist, even though sounding 
complex. 
Simulation is the most sophisticated method of the cartel damage calculation methods. It is 
based on a model that specifies the whole industry. Simulation is most certainly not the most 
72  See Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001), p. 886. 
73  For further details regarding factors that facilitate collusion, see e.g. Motta (2004), p. 142 et seqq. 
74  See e.g. Connor (2001).  
75  See Dijk and Verboven (2008), p. 2336 et seqq. 
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flexible method especially in terms of the structural form of data, and economists should 
also be very careful in making assumptions. But the specification of an economic equilibrium 
model that directly takes demand and cost conditions as well as the option of oligopolistic 
competition conditions into account is the most sophisticated of all quantification. But cau-
tion is needed, especially because the method can be very sensitive to assumptions regarding 






3.3 Accuracy vs. practicability 
The previous sections discussed the most established methods in order to quantify the true 
value of damage a cartel has evoked. When economists and experts become acquainted with 
the respective cartel case and have to make a decision regarding the appropriate quantifica-
tion instrument, they always face a trade-off between accuracy and practicability (next to 
some other challenges and facts that reduce the range of adequate methods, such as lack 
of data, etc.).76  
As a rule, the first and overall objective in damage quantification is to calculate the cartel 
induced price increase as accurately and correctly as possible. Unbiased results and precise 
quantification of the damage have to result, which should be verifiable and present correct 
estimates. The more economic assumptions are included within the calculation, the more 
precise the damage estimation especially with regards to changing sectors. Data accessibility 
and correctness have a huge influence on how transparent and verifiable quantification can 
be. The more documentation is provided, the higher the degree of replication by a second 
expert. Reconsidering the aforementioned analysis of damage estimation methods, market 
simulation is the quantification method that bears the possibility to yield the highest degree 
of accuracy, given that profound market knowledge is achievable and decisive and large data 
requirements are satisfiable. Other than that, price prediction (after overcoming statistical 
obstacles and given that data requirements are fulfilled) and afterwards the cost-based ap-
proach (even though assuming perfect competition) deliver the highest accuracy of counter-
factual prediction.  
All these accuracy factors influence the correctness of damage quantification, but also in-
crease the impracticability of the very same thing and thus decrease the practicability of 
damage quantification. Estimation processes should proceed within a reasonable time frame 
and under the principle of proportionality. The resources must be proportional and judicious 
on both, companies’ and economists’ sides. The company’s accountants are obliged to make 
data available for the estimations and the data correctness depends (to some degree) on 
their assembly. Economists are charged with the troublesome tasks of data cleaning. Practi-
cability can best be satisfied with difference quantification methods. Before and after as well 
as yardstick approaches demand very few data and are quickly executed. The difference-in-
differences method does not diminish the degree of practicability much by simultaneously 
delivering more sophisticated quantification results.  
The scope of the trade-off between accuracy and practicability is always case-dependent and 
highly influenced by data availability. The more disaggregated data are available for the ex-
perts’ estimations, the higher the accuracy. This is more often the case, when data are pro-
vided by the relevant parties and not extracted from public sources77, even though publicly 
available data are more objective and by no means manipulated. The number of data acces-
76  Friederiszick and Röller (2010) actually examined this trade-off against the background of court 
proceedings, but, from the author’s point of view, it can one-to-one be applied to private damage 
calculation.  
77  Such as statistical offices. 
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sible determines the number of variables included and the methods applied. There is a neg-
ative relationship between the quantities of variables relative to data observations. The less 
observable data and the more variables included, the lower the accuracy of estimation.  
Judges and lawyers are most certainly not always fully able to comprehend economists’ dam-
age estimations. This is why experts are obliged to explain the logic and plausibility of meth-
ods used, which might also strengthen the trade-off between accuracy and practicability. 
The order of the damage quantification methods presented in the section above might ac-
tually represent increasing accuracy but decreasing practicability, when applying them. Sum-
ming up, one should always weigh in which direction damage quantification points. Esti-
mating the damage as exactly as possible is not the superior aim in every case but rather to 
gain an idea about the damage size as a start. 
4. Conclusion  
Cartels, no matter if price/quota ones or market sharing agreements, have in numerous cases 
been politically intended or induced in the medium past and thus did not always stand for 
anticompetitive infringements. Nowadays, cartels generally are an anticompetitive infringe-
ment. After having detected a cartel, by means of special detection mechanisms or whistle 
blowers, competition authorities impose fines on the cartelized companies.  
The quantification of damages within antitrust litigations involves some significant concep-
tual and empirical challenges. The damage estimates regularly differ enormously from fines 
imposed by competition authorities as the consequence of the anticompetitive infringement.  
A fundamental prerequisite for being able to quantify any cartel damage at all is a profound 
market understanding. First of all, economists and experts have to get an idea of the cartel-
ized good, the collusive companies, their interactions, as well as the cartel’s organizational 
structure. Figuring out crucial market characteristics, such as supply, demand, elasticities, 
capacities, prices, etc., is decisive for all further actions. The implementation of each quanti-
fication method solely rests on assumptions that are confirmed in practice to the same extent 
as refuted.  
The order of the list of approaches for quantifying damage calculation within this paper 
reflects the increasing degree of analysis profundity, aspiration level and thus robustness of 
the estimated counterfactual. The application of each existing quantification method de-
pends on the availability of information, on the one hand, and the envisaged precision of 
the results, on the other hand. The before and after method, the yardstick and difference-
in-differences methods are comparatively modest and yield appropriate quantification 
measures, but no market changes are considered. Cost based quantification methods entail 
the distinction between economic and accounting costs, imply a static view and underlying 
perfect competition, but they generate thoroughly adequate results in cases, where only very 
few data are available. Price prediction stands out due to its non-static view and the possi-
bility of taking oligopolistic behavior into account. Nevertheless, the same cartel overcharge 
is assumed for every year under consideration, and misspecifications are possible that could 
decisively influence the estimation results. Damage quantification based on market simula-





methods do not rely on cost data provided and are very transparent for outsiders, but they 
imply the largest challenges for economists with regard to market comprehension require-
ments at the same time. 
Estimating cartel overcharges will thus get more and more complex, if dynamic effects are 
taken into account. A decision between accuracy of quantification results and practicability 
of implementation needs to be made beforehand. Defining the exact cartel period, as the 
fundamental prerequisite for damage calculation, might already present an insurmountable 
obstacle. Price patterns might not be that obvious as e.g. some cartels do need some time 
to form, or episodes of cheating occur that disturb the price pattern, or temporary reversion 
to competitive prices occur. The closer the quantification of the actual damage gets to reality 
(drawing on different market types, such as oligopolistic ones, or types of competition, Ber-
trand vs. Cournot), the more complex this task gets. 
Summing up, there are various cartel damage estimation methods, which all have their ad-
vantages and disadvantages concerning the degree of difficulty, data requirements, ade-
quacy, practicability, and replicability. When making use of one of these methods, meeting 
the legal standards of proof as well as portraying the counterfactual as realistically as possi-
ble has priority, with a given level of information and database. This fact influences the ad-
equacy of each quantification method case by case. Each economist is obliged to reliably 
substantiate the underlying assumptions within the implementation of the various quantifi-
cation methods. Future research is well advised to shed some light on indirect purchasers’ 
damage, the use of other monetary indexes in case no price data are available and further 
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